Roundtable discussion and accompanying research yield several key takeaways covered in this report (the "Report"):
• Dodd-Frank will impose costs on both PE and VC firms, but only will change how a small subset of firms actually operates. Rule 203(l)-1 will impose administrative and compliance burdens for registered firms and also will constrain firms' flexibility by limiting the types of deal structures that they might use.
• The PE/VC distinction is a complex assessment; the use of leverage and certain operational differences suggest grounds for delineation, but differences between PE and VC largely exist on a spectrum. The perception of a sharp culture clash ignores the many nuanced shades of PE and VC, but the issues of leverage and how each industry approaches regulation suggest that at least some differences are more pronounced.
• The next major regulatory challenge implicating the PE/VC distinction will be legislation concerned with systemic risk (such as the Volcker rule). Against a backdrop of fears about systemic risk, the PE/VC distinction will feature in questions of federal rulemaking and regulatory gamesmanship, but Roundtable participants were adamant that neither PE nor VC, however defined or distinguished from one another, meaningfully pose systemic risk.
This Report addresses each major point in turn, placing particular emphasis on the Dodd- 
II. "Venture Capital Fund" in Dodd-Frank: Definition and Impact
Roundtable discussion about the definition of "venture capital fund" in Dodd-Frank implicates two considerations: (a) an overview of the definition and its regulatory significance, and (b) the definition's impact on both private equity and venture capital funds. These issues further inform debate about the difference between venture capital and private equity, covered in Section III.
A. "Venture Capital Fund" Defined
Although Dodd-Frank "spans over 2,300 pages and affects almost every aspect of the U.S. financial services industry," 16 of particular interest to Roundtable participants was an amendment to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 ("IAA"), 17 section 203(l)-1 (the "venture capital exemption" or "the exemption"). 18 The venture capital exemption defines "venture capital fund" and provides that an investment adviser that solely advises venture capital funds is exempt from registration under the IAA.
19
The IAA regulates certain kinds of investment advisers (such as advisers to hedge funds, to private equity funds, and to other types of pooled investment vehicles 20 ), requiring them to register with the SEC and "conform to regulations designed to protect investors." 21 As the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") explains, the venture capital exemption is "intended to distinguish advisers to 'venture capital funds' from advisers to 'private equity funds,' for which Congress did not provide an exemption" from registration under the IAA.
22
The venture capital exemption defines a venture capital fund as a fund that: Halstedt summarized his view by acknowledging that even if the exemption "in large measure got it right," it dramatically reduces VC flexibility.
37
Mendelson reminded the Roundtable that "none of this means that a VC can't do an investment it wants, it just means that the VC has to suck it up and do more paperwork" required for IAA registration. Mendelson hastened to add, however, that in terms of the kind of information that firms are required to divulge, "even the exemption form is heinous." Tad Kelly voiced concern about the challenge of keeping information current. Brad Feld was blunt: the venture capital exemption just "adds another layer of bureaucracy."
Not all Roundtable participants were as animated about the venture capital exemption having a substantial impact on firms. Ken Fugate offered a terse assessment of the impact of the exemption: "I don't foresee a change in practices." George Hagerty, Partner at Hogan Lovells, concurred, expressing skepticism about any significant chilling effect on investments or fund behavior. Beau Stark, Partner at Gibson Dunn & Crutcher, was more circumspect about the committed capital, and any such borrowing, indebtedness, guarantee or leverage is for a non-renewable term of no longer than 120 calendar days. Release, supra note 18 at 55. 36 Rule 203(l)-1 defines a qualifying portfolio company for purposes of the exemption as one that does not borrow or issue debt obligations in connection with the venture capital fund's investment in the company and distribute to the fund the proceeds of such borrowing or issuance in exchange for the fund's investment. Release, supra note 18 at 41. 37 Although not expressly discussed at the Roundtable, another potential constraint on investing flexibility is the SEC's view that Congress did not intend the venture capital exemption to apply to venture capital funds of funds. Release, supra note 18 at 49. A fund may disregard a wholly owned intermediate holding company formed solely for tax, legal or regulatory reasons to hold the fund's investment in a qualifying portfolio company (Release, supra note 18 at 51-2), but a VC fund of funds is not permitted. One issue that arises from this is that two VC funds might not be able to syndicate and use a subsidiary to own the portfolio company because the holding company would no longer be "wholly owned." Thus, this could be interpreted to mean that all syndicated investments will have to be directly into the portfolio company and not through a subsidiary. Credit to Charles Sommers for this observation.
exemption's impact on firms, remarking, "the answer to the question will be known soon; [but] if
[registration] is much of a constraint on VC activity, then you will see bigger shops set up a special purpose [sidecar] fund with a registered adviser in charge of that fund." 38 Stark further observed that, at least for larger funds with more than $750 million under management, having a registered adviser is not particularly burdensome.
Although consensus was not quite reached among participants about the magnitude of the exemption's impact on firms, discussion of the topic also spurred more lively debate about how private equity and venture capital differ.
III. Differences Between Venture Capital and Private Equity
The most animated portion of the Roundtable centered on the differences-both technical and cultural-between private equity and venture capital. The PE/VC distinction implicates several interrelated features: public perception, leverage and fund operations more generally, attitudes towards regulation, and fund/investment size. Regarding (misguided) public perception and fund/investment size, Roundtable participants were in general agreement that private equity and venture capital exist on a spectrum rather than as binary categories. In terms of leverage and attitudes towards regulation, however, many participants (excepting a stronger view or two) saw a starker contrast, with private equity regarded as both distinctly more leverage-friendly and regulation-insensitive.
Public perception and stereotypes about the PE/VC distinction informed the Roundtable debate on the topic. Although not expressly emphasized in Roundtable discussion, coverage of the Silver Lake/Skype deal 39 illuminates contrasting visions of private equity and venture capital.
Steven Davidoff has written of the contrasting perception as emblemized in the deal: "Venture capital is viewed as a creative industry, while the world considers private equity as finance, 38 "An SPV, or a special purpose entity (SPE), is a legal entity created by a firm...by transferring assets to the SPV, to carry out some specific purpose or circumscribed activity, or a series of such transactions. SPVs have no purpose other than the transaction(s) for which they were created. 43 A leveraged buyout ("LBO") is "the acquisition of another company using a significant amount of borrowed money (bonds or loans) to meet the cost of acquisition. Often, the assets of the company being acquired are used as collateral for the loans in addition to the assets of the acquiring company. The purpose of leveraged buyouts is to allow companies to make large acquisitions without having to commit a lot of capital. Discussion of the differences between PE and VC was not limited to invoking shorthand criticisms based on public perception. One well-regarded lawyer who was unable to attend the Roundtable discussion commented in email correspondence that, in the lower middle private equity market (fund size of $250 million to $1 billion), the stereotypical view of the culture clash 44 See ECONOMIST, supra note 43. Beau Stark offered a sharp riposte to such a view: "you cannot characterize PE as lurking for ways to fire people." 45 Chris Leach also proffered that the venture capital fund exemption is "a political subsidy for non-reporting based on the sentiment that 'VCs create jobs.'" 46 A dividend recapitalization is when "a company incurs a new debt in order to pay a special dividend to private investors or shareholders. This usually involves a company owned by a private investment firm, which can authorize a dividend recapitalization as an alternative to selling its equity stake in the company. pitting ruthless PE financiers against entrepreneur-friendly VCs is, in fact, "quite the opposite."
The lawyer's observations lend a provocative alternative view of the PE/VC culture clash:
[V]enture/crossover funds sometimes step into my PE growth equity/buyout deals and I am always shocked at how rigid their structures are and how investorfriendly the terms are (participating preferred/common equity, all rights in favor of investors (preemptive rights, co-sale, registration, etc.)). Most of our PE fund clients invest their equity in the same class as the founders or at least nonparticipating convertible preferred so there is not an economic distinction between them.
The lawyer further opined that PE investors frequently use creative structures (LLC holding companies instead of the C corporation) to give "the cheapest, most management friendly equity available-profits interests."
49
In contrast to the use of stock/options-based incentive arrangements typically seen in venture capital deals, the use of profits interests for management in certain private equity deals can create especially tax-advantaged incentives. 50 "The sale of a profits interest always results in capital gain, is not subject to any holding period requirements beyond the one-year long-term capital gain holding period and does not require the holder to put capital at risk." 51 In private follow up discussion, two Colorado-based private equity lawyers noted that private equity's concern for management might vary according to size of the private equity firm. The lawyers suggested that whereas the biggest PE firms might not be as management friendly as are venture capitalists because those PE firms have such strong brand strength, middle market PE firms can be more management friendly.
Discussion also compared the operational strategies of PE and VC. Beau Stark remarked that both PE and VC closely focus on company management, and that "both industries look for ways to improve company operations and they do it at different stages of the company's growth/size." In response to the suggestion that PE and VC have similar attitudes regarding Davidoff has written on the same phenomenon, remarking that, compared to private equity, venture capital has a better public image. The Roundtable's overall sentiment regarding the PE/VC distinction, then, was a complex assessment. Virtually all participants may have agreed that the perception of a sharp culture clash ignores the many nuanced shades of PE and VC, but the issues of leverage and how each industry approached regulation indeed suggest that some differences are more pronounced.
Consensus was more readily found, however, in the Roundtable's consideration of the next major regulatory challenges implicating the PE/VC distinction.
IV. The Next Big Thing: Systemic Risk
In considering "the next big thing," the Roundtable generally agreed that the next major regulatory challenge implicating the PE/VC distinction will be legislation concerned with systemic risk, 56 such as the Volcker rule. 57 Roundtable participants were equally, if not more, 56 Steven Schwarcz has argued that systemic risk is "the risk that (i) an economic shock such as market or institutional failure triggers (through a panic or otherwise) either (X) the failure of a chain of markets or institutions or (Y) a chain of significant losses to financial institutions, (ii) resulting in increases in the cost of capital or adamant that neither private equity nor venture capital, however defined or distinguished from one another, meaningfully pose systemic risk. Of course, whatever the ultimate regulatory classification of Rule 203(l)-1, Roundtable participants agreed with Josh Widoff's point that it "doesn't achieve systemic risk protection or investor protection." Tad Kelly also criticized whatever might come of the Volcker rule, opining that "as soon as the final text of the Volcker rule comes out, there will be five or six big investment banks who sell products to depository banks splitting the difference between debt and equity to come out just on the right side of having too much leverage." Steve Halstedt offered a critical encomium to the Roundtable's discussion of the future of financial regulation. "The 60 Deleveraging is "the unwinding of debt. Companies use leveraging (i.e., borrowing) to accelerate their growth or return, however, when a company is concerned about defaulting on its obligations or concerned about rampant losses, it can use deleveraging to lower its risk of default and mitigate its losses...Deleveraging can have serious financial consequences when a company tries to unwind assets that are illiquid. In this case, deleveraging may mean selling assets at a relatively steep discount. As a result, deleveraging may lead to downward pressure on security and asset prices. . . ." Deleveraging, INVESTOR GLOSSARY, http://www.investorglossary.com/deleveraging.htm (last visited June 28, 2012). 61 Evincing Roundtable complaint about Congress not understanding the distinction between systemic risk and investor protection, the venture capital fund exemption implicates registration under the IAA, which the SEC proclaims is designed to require investment advisors to "conform to regulations designed to protect investors." See SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, supra note 17. 62 Release, supra note 18 at 10. mentality of regulators is to come up with a rule for everything. The mentality of VCs and PE people is to break all the rules. Regulators will come up with new rules, but I worry about regulatory creep."
Conclusion
The PE/VC distinction implicates a variety of issues, several of which are important touch points for future regulation and investment activity. Roundtable discussion and research suggests that (a) Dodd-Frank will impose costs on both PE and VC firms, but only will change how a small subset of firms actually operates; (b) the PE/VC distinction is complex-the use of leverage and certain operational differences suggest grounds for delineation, but differences between PE and VC largely exist on a spectrum; and (c) the next major regulatory challenge implicating the PE/VC distinction will be legislation concerned with systemic risk (such as the Volcker rule). That Roundtable participants strongly feel that neither PE nor VC, however defined or distinguished from one another, meaningfully pose systemic risk, only underscores the high stakes of financial regulation.
